Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues - Agropolis Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Resource and Energy Economics Année : 2018

Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues

Résumé

To address the issue of potential information asymmetries inherent in the estimation of deforestation baselines required by the current Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation+ (REDD+) scheme, we offer a theoretical analysis of an extended scheme relying on the theory of incentives. We compare two types of contracts: a deforestation-based contract and a policy-based contract. Each of them implies a dramatically different information rent/efficiency trade-off due to domestic implementation and transaction costs. If the contract is deforestation-based (resp. policy-based), information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest (resp. highest) intended deforestation. We show that a general contract can be offered to recipient countries in which the type of instrument proposed is endogenous, independent of the historical trend, unlike the current REDD+ mechanism. Dividing countries into two groups corresponding to the deforestation-based instrument and the policy-based instrument helps the donor country to obtain efficient deforestation and avoided deforestation levels.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
REDD_18July2017.pdf (560.07 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-01643656 , version 1 (21-11-2017)

Identifiants

Citer

Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline, Jean-Christophe Poudou, Sébastien Roussel. Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues. Resource and Energy Economics, 2018, 51, pp.1-17. ⟨10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.10.004⟩. ⟨halshs-01643656⟩
805 Consultations
1603 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More